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A supercomputer is a repairable system with large number of compute nodes 
interconnected to work in harmony to achieve superior computational performance. 
Reliability of such a complex system depends on an effective maintenance strategy that 
involves both emergency and preventive maintenance. This thesis analyzes the 
maintenance records of four supercomputers operational at The National Institute of 
Computational Science located at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. We propose to use the 
generalized proportional intensities model (GPIM) to model the maintenance interrupts as 
it can capture both the reliability parameters and maintenance parameters and allows the 
inclusion of both emergency and preventive maintenance. We use this model to obtain the 
reliability parameters indicating the system performance and maintenance parameters 
indicating the effectiveness of maintenance actions for each of the four supercomputers. 
System performance measures such as reliability and availability are used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the existing maintenance policy and to propose a new maintenance policy 
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First, Sections 1.1 and 1.2 provides the background and motivation of the thesis, 
respectively. Then, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 discuss the data and methodologies used in this 
thesis, respectively. Section 1.5 presents the purpose of the work. Finally, Section 1.6 gives 
the structure of this thesis.  
 
1.1 Background 
In modern times, human life is being increasingly dependent on various advanced 
technologies. There is a growing demand for handling huge data storage, analysis of big 
data, implementation of complex algorithms, etc. for addressing modern day problems. 
Modelling and simulating different real life scenarios are becoming increasingly important 
to scientific predictions. With these growing computational and simulation needs, 
supercomputers become necessary and play a critical role in various fields such as nuclear, 
oil and gas explorations, environmental studies, medical research, healthcare, 
communications, transportation, and so on.  
 
A supercomputer is a system that provides supercomputing capabilities and has the highest 
performance with largest capability and capacity in a period of time (Xie, Fang, Hu, & Wu, 
2010). The latest supercomputers are capable of reaching one thousand million floating 
point operations per second, usually called as one petaflop.  
 
Supercomputer architecture is an interface between hardware, and software and form the 
basis for its high computing capability. Supercomputers may run complex algorithms 
requiring a relatively long, a few months to solve. Any interruption to its normal 
functioning at an intermediate point will require the entire task to be restarted or to start 
from the previous checkpoint, if check pointing is possible and implemented. This makes 
the supercomputer unavailable not only during the emergency maintenance time, needed 
to fix the problem but also the entire period from which the job is started, considering that 
it should have successfully completed other smaller jobs during this time. It can be 
interrupted due to failures in processors, memory storage devices and other physical 
component(s), termed as hardware failures or due to failures in the input/output system and 
the interconnect system, termed as software failures.  Any of these failures lead to improper 
functioning of supercomputer and consequently result in loss of data, termination or pause 
of on-going tasks, and so on.  
 
It is of high interest to design a highly dependable supercomputer to run the jobs without 
any interruption. With large number of components that can possibly fail and cause 
interruption, a supercomputer’s dependability is a function of its reliability, availability and 
maintainability (Stearley, 2005). In this aspect, it becomes necessary for a supercomputer 
to have an effective maintenance policy that can restore it after a failure and that can 
effectively identify and address the incipient failures. In order to maintain the availability 
of such a system at a required level, it is important to understand its failure characteristics 




This work is motivated by the demand to analyze the real time maintenance records of four 
supercomputers, namely, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken, which are located and 
operated at The National Institute for Computational Sciences in Oak Ridge National Lab, 
Tennessee, US.   
 
Athena, Cray XT4 supercomputer is dedicated for climate, weather and quantum chromo-
dynamics research. With 18,048 cores, 4,512 compute nodes, two AMD Opteron 2.3 GHz 
quad-core processors at each node and 18 terabytes of memory, it can reach a peak 
performance of 166 teraflop (Baer, 2010). Jaguar and Jaguar PF are used for the internal 
differentiation of Cray XT4 and Cray XT5 machines, respectively. Cray XT5 has a peak 
performance of 1.38 petaflop, while Cray XT4 has 0.26 petaflop. Both these put together 
have a system memory of 362 TB and 45,208 quad-core Opteron processors. SeaStar2+ 
3D torus connects the compute nodes (Bland, Kendall, Kothe, Rogers, & Shipman, 2009). 
Kraken is Cray XT5 supercomputer with a peak performance of 1.17 petaflop, 147 TB of 
compute memory and 9,408 compute nodes, it is the most powerful supercomputer used 
for academic purposes.  SeaStar2+ router connects the compute nodes that have two 2.6 
GHz hex-core processors (NICS, 2014). 
 
1.3 Maintenance Records of the Supercomputers 
The main data in the work are the maintenance records of the four supercomputers, Athena, 
Jaguar, Jaguar PF and, Kraken. The data was collected for the period from October 2009 
to December 2010.  These records include both emergency maintenance and preventive 
maintenance. Emergency maintenance is a maintenance activity performed immediately 
after a system’s failure with an intention to fix the problem and restore it to its normal 
operating mode. Preventive maintenance is a maintenance activity that is usually 
performed at regular pre-determined intervals with an intention to identify and reduce 
incipient failures that can potentially cause a system failure at a later stage, thus reducing 
the occurrence of actual failures. The maintenance policy for the four supercomputers calls 
for immediate emergency maintenance after every failure and preventive maintenance at 
regular interval of two weeks. It can be noted from the maintenance records that the 
preventive maintenance was not performed at a fixed interval for any of the four 
supercomputers, probably due to some practical restrictions. It may be due to the fact that 
the supercomputer is not intentionally interrupted while performing a job. 
 
Each maintenance performed is entered into the event log system manually and includes: 
 Downtime: it is the date and time at which the system’s normal functioning is 
interrupted due to either the emergency maintenance or the preventive maintenance. 
This is also called as Incident Start Time. 
 Uptime: it is the date and time at which the system is brought back to its normal 
functioning after either the emergency maintenance or the preventive maintenance. 
This is also called as Incident End Time. 
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 Type of the interrupt: it indicates if the interruption is due to emergency 
maintenance or preventive maintenance. 
The raw maintenance records obtained for each supercomputer are refined by eliminating 
any redundancies. Table 1 shows the number of emergency and preventive maintenance 
records after refining the raw data for each supercomputer, over the recorded period. 
 
 
Table 1: Number of maintenance records for each supercomputer 
Maintenance Type 
Supercomputer 
Athena Jaguar Jaguar PF Kraken 
Emergency 35 58 130 53 
Preventive 7 30 39 23 




A system that can be restored to satisfactory performance after failing to perform one or 
more of its intended functions satisfactorily by employing a method other than replacing 
the entire system is called a repairable system (Ascher & Feingold, 1984). This is the most 
commonly used definition of a repairable system. A supercomputer is a combination of 
several clusters, with each cluster having several modules.  Each module has its own failure 
characteristic and can fail independently, causing a system failure. Each cluster can be 
repaired independently and is done by repair or replacement of its module(s).  The 
maintenance records available do not contain any information at a module level but are at 
a system level. Thus, the maintenance records can be considered as a superimposition of 
interruptions at module level. Therefore, the analysis of maintenance records is done 
considering the failure of the system as a whole. Each of the four supercomputers is 
considered to be a complex repairable system as they can be restored to satisfactory 
performance after each interruption. 
 
We have a situation where each time there is an interruption of a supercomputer, a 
maintenance activity returns it to a satisfactory operating condition, creating an interrupt-
maintenance-interrupt-maintenance cycle. The interruption can be due to the emergency 
maintenance or the preventive maintenance.  In order to estimate a supercomputer 
performance measures, it is required to understand the interrupt characteristics and the 
maintenance characteristics. Interrupt characteristics can be understood by modelling the 
maintenance records using a statistical model that best fits the time to interrupts of a 
supercomputer. Maintenance characteristics can be understood by modelling the repair 
time using a probability life distribution model.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review done on supercomputers in order to gain 
understanding of analysis approaches used to analyze failure data of supercomputers. It 
also presents the literature review done on repairable systems in general to understand the 
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evolution of statistical models used to model their failure data. It has been established that 
general proportional intensity model (GPIM) can be used to model the maintenance records 
of supercomputers. This model has the provision to model both emergency and preventive 
maintenance together and also considers their effectiveness of system restoration. GPIM is 
used to model the interruption process of each of the four supercomputers separately. 
Probability life distributions are used to model the repair times of the maintenance activities 
of each of the four supercomputers separately. The results of these two models are used to 
estimate the availability of each of the four supercomputers. All these results are used to 
review the existing maintenance policy and propose new maintenance policy if there is a 
scope for improvement. 
 
1.5 Purpose of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the maintenance records of each of the four 
supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken to understand their dependability. 
Dependability of a supercomputer is a function of its reliability, availability and 
maintainability. 
 
The real time maintenance data of the four supercomputers is used to obtain the below 
outcomes, for each of it. 
 Statistically model the process of occurrence of maintenance interrupts 
 Estimate the reliability and maintainability parameters 
 Model the repair time to fit life probability distributions 
 Calculate the achieved availability during the observed period and estimate the 
predicted availability 
 Comment on the existing maintenance policy and propose an improved 
maintenance policy 
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review 
on the basic reliability and availability models and those related to the reliability of high 
performance computing. Chapter 3 presents GPIM and the approach followed to obtain the 
reliability and maintainability parameters of each supercomputer, along with the results for 
each supercomputer. Chapter 4 presents the repair time analysis and the basic statistics of 
the repair times of each supercomputer. The analysis is conducted for the repair times of 
only the emergency maintenance, only the preventive maintenance, and both emergency 
and preventive maintenances. Chapter 5 presents the system availability measures for each 
supercomputer along with comments on existing maintenance policy and proposes a new 




2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.1 focuses on the literature review of 
failure analysis done on high performance computing systems. Section 2.2 focuses on the 
literature review of repairable systems and the approach used to analyze their failure 
occurrences. Section 2.4 summarizes the findings of the literature review that are 
applicable to this thesis. Finally, Section 2.4 explains how the work done in this thesis is 
different from the other publications. 
 
2.1 Failure Analysis on Supercomputers 
Supercomputers are computing systems with the highest capability that can handle the 
computational needs in a given period of time. The evolution of supercomputers, propelled 
by the discoveries made in materials and manufacturing over the past 40 years, is 
noteworthy and they have seen a 10-fold increase in the performance, every 4 years. Their 
computational performance has been improved with changes in architecture, software, 
applications, etc., the latest being massive parallel processing and cluster systems that 
integrate large number of components (Riganati, 1984; Scheneck, 1990; Xie, Fang, Hu, & 
Wu, 2010; Yang, Liao, & Song, 2011). The failures on any component, be it hardware, 
software, input/output systems or interconnect system can hinder its normal functioning. 
A proper repair action has to be performed to get it back to its normal operational mode. It 
is required to understand the failure pattern to make important organizational decisions 
such as maintenance policy to be followed, inventory requirements, etc.  
 
The body of literature on supercomputer shows that there is a lot of focus on the 
supercomputer architecture and ways to improve its computing performance. The primary 
interest is to study the part of literature that specifically focuses on the work done on failure 
analysis of supercomputers, aiming at understanding its performance and suggesting ways 
to improve its maintenance. It is observed that failure analysis has been done on high 
performance computing systems operational in both laboratory and commercial setups. 
The work varied depending on the type of data collected and the focus of the study.  
 
Two publications focused on the causes of failure and presented the basic statistical data. 
One publication studied Tandem supercomputer over a period of 3 years and presented the 
basic statistical data comparing its failure causes. The failure causes are categorized as 
environmental, human related, interconnect, software and hardware. It also presented the 
data showing that the reliability of the hardware component of the system is improved by 
proper maintenance plan (Gray, 1990). The other publication characterized the causes of 
machine reboot of Windows NT, the network system in a commercial environment.  The 
observations show that most of the reboots are caused by software. It is also shown that 
rebooting does not solve the problem but only contributes to the machine downtime 
(Kalyanakrishnam, Kalbarczyk, & Iyer, 1999). There is one publication that focuses on 
understanding the correlation of failures with factors external to the system. Failure 
analysis of a large scale server environment, holding up to 400 servers show that system 
errors exhibit a time varying behavior with periodic patterns. It has been shown that the 
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failure rates have a strong correlation with workload and the number of hours of operation 
in a day. (Sahoo, Squillante, Sivasubramaniam, & Zhang, 2004).   
 
Two publications focused on time between failures, repair times, and rate of failure. These 
publications used probability life distributions to fit the time between failures, and repair 
times and used the probability density function to estimate the rate of failure. It is shown 
that Weibull distribution and exponential distributions are a good fit for the time to failures. 
Failure analysis of internet service interruptions on a collection of interconnected 
computers treated as a high performance computing system shows that time between 
failures is modelled by a Weibull distribution with shaper parameter less than 1, showing 
a decreasing failure rate (Heath, 2002).  23000 failures records of about 20 different large 
computing clusters are analyzed and life distributions are fitted to the time between 
failures, and the repair times. Weibull distribution with shape parameters ranging from 0.7 
to 0.8 are fitted for the time between failures, and lognormal distributions are fitted for the 
repair times. It is reported that the failures show decreasing hazard rate and repair times 
vary a lot across different clusters (Schroeder & Gibson, 2010). 
 
Three publications have focused on understanding the availability of high performance 
computing clusters. One publication studies two DEC VAX cluster multicomputer systems 
and established that there are correlated failures caused due to shared resources. It is shown 
that about 40% of failures occurs in bursts. The failure data is used to model the availability 
of system based on K out of n systems approach (Tang, Iyer, & Subramani, 1990). The 
other publication studied the individual server failures to understand failure propagation 
between 503 servers of Networked Windows NT system, in a commercial environment. It 
was observed that software and hardware failures are the major contributors and the 
average availability of individual server is over 99% (Xu, Kalbarcyzyk, & Iyer, 1999). The 
third publication studied real time event logs from a 512 node clusters in Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. A single framework that coordinates event monitoring, 
filtering, data analysis and dynamic availability modeling is presented based on the Markov 
chain models (Song, Chokchai, Nassar, Gottumukkala, & Scott, 2006).  
 
To the best of our search, we did not find any publication with a focus on analyzing the 
maintenance records of supercomputers that takes into account both emergency 
maintenance and preventive maintenance. Also, we did not find any publication that 
focuses on optimally scheduling the preventive maintenance interval of a supercomputer. 
In this regard, it is important to review the literature on modelling approaches to model the 
failure data of a repairable system to see if there exists a model that can be used for the 
maintenance records of the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF and Kraken. 
 
2.2 Failure Analysis of Repairable Systems 
This section presents different models used in literature to model the failure data of a 
repairable system and discusses the suitability of them to model the maintenance records 
of the four supercomputers. 
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2.2.1 Component failure analysis 
In the context of this thesis, a component is anything that once failed, the cost of repair is 
almost equal to cost of the component and so it is better to replace rather than repair it, 
after a failure. Thus, for a component, the failure analysis is based on the time to first 
failure. To model the reliability of a component, one needs to fit an appropriate probability 
life distribution to the time to first failures of all the components tested. Fitting probability 
distributions requires selecting a probability model that best fits the failure data, from a list 
of models that are generally used in reliability analysis (Barlow & Proschan, 1975; 
ReliaSoft). Proper model selection criteria is to be used to select the best model and one 
needs a good understanding on various facets of multi-model selection (Akaike, 1974; 
Schwarz, 1978; Burnham & Anderson, 2004; Quesenberry & Kent, 1982; Ye, Meyer, & 
Neuman, 2008). Once the probable model is selected, the parameters that best fit the failure 
data are estimated (Basu, 1964; Scholz, 2004).  
 
The approach is used to fit the life distributions to the time between failures of 
supercomputers in some publications (Heath, 2002; Schroeder & Gibson, 2010) but it is 
not appropriate. This approach is only suitable to model the time to first failures as they 
can be treated as independent and identically distributed (IID).  Life distributions are not 
appropriate to model the time between failures (interrupts) of a supercomputer (a repairable 
system) as they are neither independent nor identically distributed but can be used to model 
the repair times of the supercomputers as repair times form a series of random variables 
that are IID. 
 
2.2.2 Repairable system analysis 
The time between failures of a repairable system are not IID and so a repairable system has 
to be modelled by a process rather than a distribution (ReliaSoft). Literature on repairable 
systems is primarily focused on modeling failure occurrences using counting theory or 
point process theory.  
 
Duane model is the earliest model that accounts for the changes in failure rates over the 
system life (Duane, 1964). AMSAA model proposes a more accurate model to fit the 
occurrence of failures of a repairable system and is based on stochastic point process (Crow 
L. H., 1984). It defines the intensity of the failures observed in a repairable system as the 
rate of change of expected number of failures with respect to time. Figure 1 shows 
geometric representation of the failures modelled by stochastic point process.  𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 
… represent the time of occurrence of failures and   𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3, … represent the time 
between failures. A lot of publications focus their study in this area and various other 
models have been proposed. The summary of about fifteen distinct growth models is 
provided in The Military Handbook: Reliability Growth Management (Department of 
Defense, 1981). NHPP based on power law model is the most popular process in literature 
used to obtain the failure intensity function of a repairable system as it can model both 




Figure 1: Geometric interpretation of failures modelled by stochastic point process  
 
 
2.2.3 As good as new maintenance models 
When a maintenance activity restores the repairable system such that it is brought back to 
as good as new (AGAN) condition, in which it is just as it was first operated, then it is 
called a perfect maintenance. In this case, the time between failures of the system form 
random variables that are IID and the failure process is said to follow a renewal process 
(Taylor & Karlin, 1994). Figure 2 shows the graph of failure intensity vs time for a system 








The linear baseline intensity is used for illustration purpose. It can be seen that the failure 
intensity is reset to zero by each maintenance action performed after a failure has occurred. 
ASAN model is a bad model for complex repairable systems as any maintenance will only 
fix a part of the system to restore it to a satisfactory performance but does not repair 
majority of other components. Predominant presence of aged components means that the 
system is not renewed with respect to its reliability aspects. Thus, this model is ruled out 
to model the maintenance records of the four supercomputers.  
 
2.2.4 As good as old maintenance models 
When a maintenance activity restores the system such that it is brought back to as good as 
old (AGAO) condition, in which it is just as it was immediately before the occurrence of 
failure, then it is called minimal maintenance. In this case, the time between failures of the 
system form random variables that are not IID and the failure process is modelled by Non 
homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). If the rate of occurrence of interrupts is constant 
over time, i.e., constant failure intensity, it is a special case of NHPP that follows 
homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) (Crow, 1975). Reliability trend tests are used to 
statistically verify if the failure intensity is constant, increasing, or decreasing (Coit, 2005; 
Kvaloy & Lindqvist, 1998). Figure 3 shows the graph of failure intensity vs time for a 





Figure 3: Failure intensity for AGAO model  
 
 
It can be seen that there is no change in the failure intensity after each maintenance 
followed by occurrence of a failure. AGAO model, also called as NHPP model is a poor 
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model for systems with very few components for which the intensity function usually 
changes following maintenance but it can be considered for systems with large number of 
components. Thus, for the supercomputers this model cannot be ruled out but it may not 
be a practical case always as it considers only one possible case of restoration. Also, one 
has to treat both the emergency and preventive maintenance in the same way to use this 
model.  
 
2.2.5 Models considering maintenance effectiveness 
AGAN and AGAO are only two possibilities that a repairable system can be restored to. 
AGAN is an extreme case and is the best possible state of restoration. A more practical 
case may be that after the maintenance, the system is restored to a condition which is worse 
than new and better than the condition at which it has failed. Brown and Proschan proposed 
an imperfect repair model in which it is considered that a maintenance restores the system 
to AGAN with probability 𝑝 and AGAO with probability (1 − 𝑝) (Brown & Proschan, 
1983). Chan and Shaw (Chan & Shaw, 1993) model and the quasi renewal model (Jack, 
1998) are two other models which are on the similar lines. However, these models still 
consider that all the maintenance activities restore a system to either AGAN or AGAO, 
thus creating a need for other models that can consider the general effect of maintenance 
on the system’s performance. A maintenance can affect a system in a way that it reduces 
the system’s failure intensity where it actually fixes the problem, or in a way that it 
increases the system’s failure intensity, cases where it may induce new defects, such as in 
photocopiers.  
 
The literature contains many models that can accommodate different effects of 
maintenance on system’s performance. This section covers the prominent models. The age 
reduction Kijima Type I and Type II models (Kijima, 1989) and proportional intensity 
model (PIM) (Cox, 1972; Percy, Kobbacy, & Ascher, 1998) are the most commonly used 
models to model a repairable system under imperfect maintenance. Both these models 
contain NHPP as the baseline model. Age reduction model modifies the intensity function 
considering a virtual age to which a system is reset to after maintenance. The virtual age is 
a fraction of the actual age whose magnitude is decided by the effectiveness of 
maintenance. This does not modify the baseline intensity. The PIM modifies the baseline 
intensity function after each maintenance by a multiplicative or an additive factor whose 
magnitude depends on the effectiveness of maintenance. Doyen and Gaudoin (Doyen & 
Gaudoin, 2004) proposed models with failure intensity improvement factor after each 
repair and is based on two approaches, arithmetic reduction, and geometric reduction. 
Multiplicative scaling of the intensity function after maintenance is a more recent proposed 
model and better fits the physical situation of a repairable system that is improving, 
deteriorating or constant with time (David F.P. & Babakalli, 2006). Figure 4 shows the 







Figure 4: Failure intensity for age reduction model  
 
 
The limitation to these models is that they are designed to model only emergency 
maintenance (followed by an actual failures) but the supercomputers have emergency as 
well as preventive maintenance. Thus, other models that can accommodate preventive 
maintenance are considered. 
 
2.2.6 Generalized maintenance models 
Generalized age reduction model (GARM) and Generalized proportional intensity model 
(GPIM) consider effect of maintenance on system’s performance and have the provision 
for modelling both the emergency and preventive maintenance together. These models are 
introduced during the past five years and indicate the increase in awareness of inclusion of 
preventive maintenance in the maintenance protocol of industries.  
 
GARM (Arwa, Soufiane, & Mounir, 2013) is an extension of the age reduction model and 
GPIM (Percy & Babakalli, 2006) is an extension of the PIM model. Though GARM is a 
good statistical model and fits the maintenance data well, it is more of a theoretical model 
than a model that considers the true nature of the repairable system. GPIM provides a more 
practical physical model and has a higher potential for maintenance decision making than 
GARM with the possibility to accommodate future extensions to this study, such as 
including predictor variables and covariates. GARM is generally used for systems 
following a block replacement policy and can be a good statistical model but has a 
limitation that it does not provide a practical description of the failure process. Replacing 
a failed timing belt of a car does not reduce the age of the car as all the other components 
are not any less likely to fail. GPIM is finding an increased attention in the literature and 
has been applied to maintenance modelling in oil and gas industry (David & Babakalli, 
2007) , gas turbines (Babakalli, 2012) and power transmission sector (Amin, Mahmood, & 
Mohsen, 2014). This provides a better description of the actual physical situation of the 
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system as it modifies the failure intensity function after every maintenance activity based 
on the effectiveness of the maintenance.  
 
2.3 Summary 
To the best of our knowledge, the literature review shows that there is no publication that 
analyzes the maintenance records of supercomputers that contain both emergency 
maintenance and preventive maintenance. 
 
The literature review shows that the below points can be considered to model the 
maintenance records of each of the four supercomputers. 
 The process of occurrence of interrupts follows stochastic point process. 
 GPIM is the best model that fits the maintenance records as it has the provision to 
model the emergency maintenance and preventive maintenance together and it also has 
factors representing the effectiveness of these two maintenance actions. 
 NHPP with power law intensity can be used as the baseline failure intensity for the 
GPIM. 
 
Thus, GPIM forms the main model for the failure analysis of the four supercomputers. 
Chapter 3 explains the approach taken to estimate the reliability and maintainability 
parameters using the GPIM and presents the results for the four supercomputers. 
 
2.4 Uniqueness of this Thesis 
To the best of our knowledge, an exhaustive literature search on failure analysis of 
supercomputers has shown that this thesis is different from the others publications in below 
ways: 
 It considers the real time maintenance records of four supercomputers in a 
laboratory environment, spanning over a period of about one year, rather than a 
single system analysis done in most other publications. 
 The four supercomputers are complex repairable systems involving large number 
of hardware and software components and are maintained by emergency as well as 
preventive maintenance, thus requiring a model with higher complexity. It is not a 
case of simple component replacement that can be modelled by AGAN or a simple 
repairable system that can be modelled by AGAO model. 
 It adopts the GPIM to model the maintenance records of the supercomputers as it 
can capture the reliability parameters and effectiveness of maintenance for both 
emergency and preventive maintenance. GPIM is used for the first time to model 
maintenance data of high performance computing systems. 
 It models the maintenance times using life distributions and uses the results in 
combination with the GPIM results to estimate the achieved and predicted 
availability of each of the four supercomputers. The results are also used to 
comment on the effectiveness of the existing maintenance policy and to propose 
an improved maintenance policy. 
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3 GENERAL PROPORTIONAL INTENSITY MODEL 
This chapter fits the GPIM to the maintenance records of each of the four supercomputers.  
Section 3.1 presents the GPIM and the analysis approach followed to estimate its reliability 
and maintainability parameters. Section 3.2 presents a statistical test to determine the trend 
of interrupts. Section 3.3 presents the GPIM parameter values and the trend test results. It 
also comments on the system’s performance and effectiveness of maintenance actions for 
each supercomputer. Section 3.4   summarizes the observations made in this chapter.  
 
3.1 GPIM and Methodology 
The interrupt-maintenance-interrupt-maintenance cycle observed on the supercomputer 
cannot be modelled by a probability life distribution as it is usually applicable to model the 
time to first failure. Moreover, the time between successive interrupts of a supercomputer 
may not be independent and identically distributed. Thus, a stochastic point process that 
models the occurrence of interrupts is appropriate for modelling this situation (Ascher & 
Feingold, 1984). This model considers time to interrupts rather than time between 
interrupts. Figure 6 presents a schematic representation of the interrupt-maintenance 
process of the supercomputers. At any given point of time the supercomputer either of the 
two states, normal operating mode or under maintenance. The maintenance records of each 
of the four supercomputers start and end with the occurrence of an interrupt, either 









This chapter is focused on the failure intensity of the supercomputer which is dependent 
on the time to interrupts. It is assumed that the interruption process is independent of the 
maintenance time at each interrupt and thus maintenance times are negligible compared to 
the time to interrupts. Thus, this chapter deals only with the normal operating state of the 
supercomputer along with the occurrence of the interrupts. The supercomputer 
maintenance state and the maintenance times analysis is dealt with in Chapter 4. Figure 6 
presents a schematic representation of the interrupt-maintenance process of the 




Figure 6: Schematic representation of the supercomputer interrupt process 
 
 
Let 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, … represent the time to successive interrupts of the supercomputer. These 
times are the supercomputer operating times.  Let 𝑇𝑘 be the random variable representing 
the total operating time of the system since it initially started until the kth interrupt. For this 
analysis, it is assumed that the initial start point for each supercomputer is the point at 
which it resumes normal functioning, after fixing the first recorded interrupt. Thus, the 
operating time at the initial start point is zero. 𝑇𝑛 represents the operating time of the 
supercomputer at the last recorded interrupt. Let 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑋3, … represent the successive 
time between interrupts of the supercomputer. Let 𝑋𝑘 be the random variable representing 
the system operating time between interrupt (𝑘 − 1) and interrupt 𝑘. 𝑇𝑘 and 𝑋𝑘 are related 
by the below two equations. 












Let 𝑍(𝑡) be the counting function and represents the number of interrupts (both emergency 
and preventive) that occur during the interval (0, 𝑡], for all 𝑡 > 0 (Leemis, 1995). It is of 
primary interest to understand the behavior of the interruption process and is described by 
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the failure intensity function, 𝜌(𝑡) which is the rate of change of expected number of 
interrupts with respect to time given by, 
     tZE
dt
d
t   (3) 
and is also called as rate of occurrence of interrupts. Figure 7 shows the notation of interrupt 





Figure 7: Geometric interpretation of stochastic point process for the supercomputers 
 
 
The failure intensity function of a GPIM is (Percy & Babakalli, 2006) , 
    






















0  (4) 
where 𝑠𝑖 (𝑟𝑗) is the intensity scaling factor for each emergency (preventive) maintenance 
and 𝑁(𝑡)(𝑀(𝑡)) is the total number of emergency (preventive) maintenance activities 
performed on the supercomputer during the interval (0, 𝑡], 𝜌0(𝑡) is the baseline intensity 
function of the supercomputer and 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑟𝑗 are positive real numbers for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,… 
𝑁(𝑡) and for 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… 𝑀(𝑡), respectively. 
 
The baseline intensity function can take many forms but the appropriate function is the one 
that corresponds to the hazard rate function of a familiar life distribution. This goes with 
the reason that for the time to first interrupt of a supercomputer, the intensity function and 
the hazard rate function are identical. Thus, the intensity function can be a constant 
intensity, log linear intensity or a power-law intensity corresponding to an exponential 
hazard, Gumbel hazard and, Weibull hazard, respectively. The most commonly used model 
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in the literature for a complex repairable systems is the power-law intensity (Crow L. H., 
1975; Huairui & Wenbiao, 2006) as it is flexible and can model increasing, decreasing and, 
constant failure rates. Thus, the time to first interrupt of each of the four supercomputers is 
assumed to have a Weibull distribution and the corresponding failure intensity function 
defined by power-law is 
   10
  tt  (5) 
where 𝜆 is the scale parameter and 𝛽 is the shape parameter corresponding to the Weibull 
hazard. 
 
 𝜆 and 𝛽 indicate the reliability parameters of the supercomputer and take positive real 
values. Particularly, 
 𝛽 lies in the interval (0,1) if the rate of occurrence of interrupts is decreasing, indicating 
that the supercomputer is improving such as experiencing infant mortality phase of the 
reliability bathtub curve; 
 𝛽 is greater than one, if the rate of occurrence of interrupts is increasing, indicating that 
the supercomputer is deteriorating such as experiencing wear out phase of the reliability 
bathtub curve; and 
 𝛽 is equal to one, if the rate of occurrence of interrupts remains constant, indicating 
that the supercomputer is stable.  
 
The intensity scaling factors can take the form of random variables varying with interrupts 
or varying with operation time or simply positive constants. For the purpose of this thesis, 
a reasonable assumption for the preliminary analysis can be that the scaling factors take 
the form of constants, i.e.,  𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,… 𝑁(𝑡) and 𝑟𝑗 = 𝑟 for 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… 𝑀(𝑡). 
Substituting these values and the base line intensity function given by Equation (5) in 
Equation (4), the intensity function modelled by GPIM is 
   )()(1 tMtN rstt    (6) 
where 𝑠 and 𝑟 are the intensity scaling factor of emergency and preventive maintenance, 
respectively. They indicate the maintainability parameters of the supercomputer and take 
positive real values. Particularly, 
 𝑠 and 𝑟 lie in the interval (0,1) if the failure intensity reduces after each maintenance 
action indicating that the maintenance has a positive effect on the performance of the 
supercomputer; 
 𝑠 and 𝑟 are greater than one, if the failure intensity increases after each maintenance 
action indicating that the maintenance has a negative effect on the performance of the 
supercomputer; and 
 𝑠 and 𝑟 are equal to one, if the failure intensity does not change after a maintenance 
action indicating that the maintenance does not change the performance of the 
supercomputer. This is a special case of GPIM where the maintenance restores the 




GPIM is used to fit the maintenance records for each of the four supercomputers, namely, 
Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF and Kraken. The next two sections elaborate on the method used 
to estimate the parameters of the GPIM model. 
 
3.1.1 Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) 
Now that the GPIM model is used and the failure intensity function is defined, the next 
step is to estimate the reliability and maintainability parameters. The values of the 
parameters have to be such that the intensity function with these parameter values should 
be the closest statistical model that can replicate the interruption process of each of the four 
supercomputers. The two general methods used for parameter estimation are least-square 
estimation and MLE. The latter is the most common method used for wide range of 
applications. MLE of a parameter is that value of the unknown parameter that results in the 
highest probability of obtaining the observed data.  
 
 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, …, 𝑇𝑛  are the successive time to interrupts and form a random sample obtained 
from a distribution that depends on four unknown parameters 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝑠, and 𝑟 with a 
probability density function 𝑓(𝑇𝑘|λ, β, s, r ). The joint probability density function of  𝑇1, 
𝑇2, 𝑇3, …, 𝑇𝑛  is called the likelihood function, 
     rsTTTTftQrsL n ,,,|,...,,,|,,, 321    (7) 
where 𝑄(𝑡) represents the observed maintenance records. Equation (7) is read as likelihood 
of the parameters 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝑠, and 𝑟 given the maintenance records of the supercomputer is 
equal to the likelihood or probability of observing the given data as a function of these 
parameters. The MLE of the four parameters are the values of these parameters that 
maximize the likelihood function. The likelihood function considering that preventive 
maintenance as a right censored data is 





















rsTdtttQrsL   (8) 
where 𝑍(𝑡) = 𝑀(𝑇) + 𝑁(𝑇) and 𝑐𝑘 is the censor indicator. 𝑐𝑘 = 1 for emergency 
maintenance and 𝑐𝑘 = 0 for preventive maintenance. 
 
Maximizing the product can get quite tedious and hence we maximize the log likelihood, 
an equivalent of likelihood due to the fact that logarithm is an increasing function. From 
Equation (8), the log likelihood function is given by 
 
         
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3.1.2 Optimizing the log-likelihood  
GPIM can get complex, especially if it is required to fit about 50 to 100 maintenance 
records. Thus, MATLAB is used to find the parameters that optimize the log-likelihood 
function of GPIM. MATLAB is a short form of matrix laboratory which is an interactive 
numerical computing environment using fourth-generation programming language. It is 
developed by Math Works and allows various matrix computations, plotting of functions, 
algorithm implementation and can interface with programs written in different languages. 
 
We used 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛, a predefined function in the optimization toolbox of MATLAB to find 
the reliability and maintainability parameters that optimize the nonlinear log-likelihood 
function given by Equation (9), to fit the maintenance records of each of the four 
supercomputers.  𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 minimizes the intensity function and takes into consideration 
the constraints on the variables or parameters and is generally called constrained nonlinear 
optimization function. Thus to maximize the log-likelihood function the negative log-
likelihood function is taken. It optimizes based on the four optimization algorithms, trust-
region-reflective algorithm, active set algorithm, interior-point algorithm, and sequential 
quadratic programming algorithm. The constraints considered while maximizing the log-
likelihood of the GPIM are that each of four parameters, 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝑠, and 𝑟  are positive. 
 
3.2 Time Trend Test 
A time trend test is can statistically determine the type of trend exhibited by the interrupt 
times. The trend can be decreasing, indicating that the supercomputer is exhibiting an 
improving behavior, or increasing, indicating that the supercomputer is exhibiting a 
deteriorating performance. If there is no trend then the system is stable and the process 
becomes HPP, a special case of NHPP. In this thesis we use Laplace trend test to check 
whether the interrupts of each of the four supercomputers exhibit a trend.  
 
The hypothesis of the Laplace trend test is given as: 
Null hypothesis:  𝐻𝑜 is that the supercomputer does not exhibit any time trend that is 
the supercomputer is stable. 
Alternate hypothesis:  𝐻𝑎 is that the supercomputer exhibits a time trend that is the 
supercomputer is either improving or deteriorating. 
 
Laplace trend test is defined for both Type I and Type II data. If the data recording is 
terminated at a predetermined time, then the maintenance record of that supercomputer is 
said to be Type I censored. If the data recording is terminated at a point of occurrence of 
an interrupt, then the supercomputer is said to be Type II censored. The maintenance 
records of the four supercomputers are terminated at the occurrence of an interrupt, rather 
than at a predetermined time, thus all the four supercomputers are considered to be Type 
II censored.  
 


























where 𝑛 is the total number of interrupts considering both emergency and preventive 





𝛼 is the significance level of the hypothesis test and 𝑍 is the value at specified 𝛼 taken from 
standard normal distribution table. 𝛼 is related to confidence limit of the hypothesis test by 
the equation, 𝛼 = 1 − (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡/100). At 5% level of significance, 𝛼 = 0.05 
and [𝑍0.025, 𝑍0.975] = [−1.96,1.96]. 
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected and there is enough evidence to accept that there is a trend 
in the interrupt process, it is of interest to know if the supercomputer has an increasing 
trend or a decreasing trend. Specifically, 
 𝑈 < 0 if there is a decreasing trend that is the interrupts are becoming less likely 
and the interval between interrupts are getting larger indicating that the 
supercomputer is improving. 
 𝑈 > 0 if there is an increasing trend that is the interrupts are becoming more likely 
and the interval between interrupts are getting smaller indicating that the 
supercomputer is deteriorating. 
 
3.3 Results 
The log-likelihood function presented by Equation (9) is used to fit the maintenance records 
of each of the four supercomputers. The MLE of the reliability parameters, scale 
parameter, 𝜆, and shape parameter  𝛽, corresponding to the Weibull distribution 
corresponding of the baseline intensity function are estimated. The maintainability 
parameters, 𝑠 and, 𝑟 representing the scaling factors of the emergency and preventive 
maintenance, respectively are estimated. 
 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the four parameters along with the maximum value of the 
log-likelihood function for each of the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, 
and Kraken.  Table 3 presents the Laplace trend test results for each of the four 
supercomputers. The rest of this section presents the observations on each supercomputer 
based on the reliability and maintenance parameters shown in Table 2 and the trend test 







Table 2: GPIM model parameter estimates 
Supercomputer ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? log likelihood 
Athena 0.0026 1.0415 0.9467 1.6231 -228.0823 
Jaguar 0.0350 0.7500 1.0882 0.8097 -356.3360 
Jaguar PF 0.0025 1.2063 1.0134 0.9965 -686.8591 
Kraken 0.0048 1.0814 1.0251 0.9585 -333.3181 
 
 




Athena -0.0821 Stationary 
Jaguar -2.0388 Improving 
Jaguar PF 2.5000 Deteriorating 




The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Athena show that 
 the shape parameter, ?̂? is almost equal to one and thus, Athena exhibits a constant 
failure intensity and is stationary. This is also confirmed by the Laplace trend test; 
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, ?̂? is 0.9467, which is less than one. Thus, 
each emergency maintenance slightly decreases the failure intensity function and has a 
positive effect on Athena’s performance; and 
 the preventive maintenance scaling factor, ?̂? is 1.6231, which is higher than one. Thus, 
each preventive maintenance prominently increases the failures intensity function and 
has a negative effect of Athena’s performance. 
 
Figure 8 shows the change in failure intensity with respect to time for Athena, as modelled 
by GPIM. It can be seen that the failure intensity between any two consecutive interrupts 
is almost constant but has a sudden change in magnitude at each interrupt, indicating the 
effectiveness of the maintenance action. We can see steep increase in failure intensity after 
each preventive maintenance action representing its scaling factor of 1.6231 and slight 
decrease in failure intensity after each emergency maintenance action representing its 
scaling factor of 0.9467. Considering the first ten interrupts,  
 Athena has preventive maintenance interrupts at 471, 1109, and 2093 and these points 
are marked by steep rise in intensity function; and 
 Athena has emergency maintenance interrupts at 626, 632, 771, 881, 1329, 2093, 2226, 










The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Jaguar show that 
 the shape parameter, ?̂? is 0.75, which is lesser than one. Thus, Jaguar exhibits a 
decreasing failure intensity and is improving as the time progresses. This is also 
confirmed by the Laplace trend test; 
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, ?̂? is 1.0882, which is greater than one. Thus, 
each preventive maintenance slightly increases the failures intensity function and has a 
negative effect of Jaguar’s performance; and 
 the preventive scaling factor, ?̂? is 0.8097, which is lesser than one. Thus, each 
preventive maintenance prominently decreases the failure intensity function and has a 
positive effect on Jaguar’s performance. 
 
Figure 9 shows the change in failure intensity of Jaguar with respect to time, as modelled 
by GPIM. It can be seen that the average failure intensity is decreasing with time. 
Considering the first ten interrupts,  
 Jaguar has preventive maintenance interrupts at 34, 152, 191, and 680 and these points 
are marked by steep fall in intensity function due to the scaling factor of 0.8097; and 
 Jaguar has emergency maintenance interrupts at 170, 173, 390, 411, 577, and 732 and 








Figure 9: Failure intensity of Jaguar vs time – GPIM 
 
 
3.3.3 Jaguar PF 
The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Jaguar PF show that 
 the shape parameter, ?̂? is 1.2063, which is greater than one. Thus, Jaguar PF exhibits 
an increasing failure intensity and is deteriorating as the time progresses. This is also 
confirmed by the Laplace trend test; and 
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, ?̂? is 1.0134 and preventive scaling factor, 
?̂? is 0.9965. Thus, the maintenance actions do not bring in any considerable change in 
the failure intensity (performance) of Jaguar PF. This indicates that each maintenance 
on Jaguar PF restores it to AGAO. 
 
Figure 10 shows the change in failure intensity with respect to time for Jaguar PF, as 
modelled by GPIM. It can be seen that the average failure intensity of Jaguar PF is 
increasing with time. It can also be seen that there is almost no sudden change in the failure 
intensity at each interrupt, indicating no change in failure intensity after each maintenance. 
There seems to be a change in the slope of the curve at about 7200 hours indicating some 
major change in the system that caused a faster deterioration of the system. The reason for 
this has to be further explored and is not available with the existing maintenance records. 
 
3.3.4 Kraken 
The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Kraken show that 
 the shape parameter, ?̂? is almost equal to one. Thus, Kraken exhibits a constant failure 






Figure 10: Failure intensity of Jaguar PF vs time - GPIM 
 
 
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, ?̂? is 1.0251, which is greater than one. Thus, 
each preventive maintenance slightly increases the failures intensity function and has a 
negative effect on Kraken’s performance; and 
 the preventive maintenance scaling factor, ?̂? is 0.9585, which is lesser than one. Thus, 
each preventive maintenance slightly increases the failure intensity function and has a 
positive effect on Kraken’s performance. 
 
Figure 11 shows the change in failure intensity with respect to time for Kraken, as modelled 
by GPIM. Considering the first ten interrupts,  
 Kraken has preventive maintenance interrupts at 862, 1018, and 1540 and these points 
are marked by slight fall in intensity function due to scaling factor of 0.9585; and 
 Kraken has emergency maintenance interrupts at 64, 121, 320, 466, 958, 1054, and 
1728 and these points are marked by slight rise in intensity function due to scaling 
factor of 1.0251. 
 
It has to be noted that at about 7200 operating hours, the rate of change of failure intensity 
gets steeper indicating that Jaguar PF performance decreases at an increased rate. This may 
be explained by the possibility of addition of a hardware component that is not compatible 





The maintenance records of each of the four supercomputers are modelled by GPIM and 
the trend in occurrence of interrupts is statistically tested by the Laplace trend test. It has 
been observed that Athena and Kraken experienced a stationary performance while Jaguar 
experienced an improvement in performance and Jaguar PF experiences a deterioration in 




Figure 11: Failure intensity of Kraken vs time - GPIM 
 
 
The change in failure intensity for the four supercomputers after each emergency 
maintenance is very marginal and can be considered to be negligible for the purpose of this 
thesis. Thus, it can be concluded that each emergency maintenance restores the 
supercomputers to AGAO state. The results are in acceptance with the fact that emergency 
maintenance is only intended to bring back the supercomputer to normal operating 
condition by fixing a problem that caused its failure.  
 
It can be observed that the preventive maintenance has varied effects on each of the four 
supercomputers showing that either the same maintenance protocol for all the 
supercomputers is not an effective solution or that the maintenance protocol followed for 
each supercomputer is different. Preventive maintenance has a negative impact on 
Athena’s performance as the failure intensity of Athena is prominently increased after each 
preventive maintenance. It may be due to the fact that the maintenance personnel are 
conducting some performance determination tests during a preventive maintenance that are 
inducing additional failures. The failure intensity of Jaguar is prominently decreased after 
each preventive maintenance, creating a positive impact on its performance. This may be 
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explained by the fact that maintenance personnel could identify the incipient failures and 
successfully address them. The change in failure intensity for Jaguar PF and Kraken after 
each preventive maintenance is very marginal and can be considered to be negligible for 
the purpose of this thesis. This indicates that the preventive maintenance on Jaguar PF and 
Kraken could not effectively identify the incipient failures and is serving only as an 
inspection done for formality. 
 




4 REPAIR TIMES ANALYSIS 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of repair times of the four supercomputers. Section 
4.1 describes the analysis approach followed in this chapter followed by Section 4.2 
providing the criteria for selection of a model from the probability models. Sections 4.3 
presents the probability models considered. Sections 4.4 - 4.6 analyze the repair times of 
emergency maintenance, preventive maintenance, and both emergency and preventive 
maintenance together, respectively, for the four supercomputers. Section 4.7 summarizes 
the results obtained in this chapter and presents the observations.    
 
4.1 Analysis Approach 
The chapter deals with the maintenance state of the supercomputer and analyzes the 
maintenance times. Emergency maintenance is a repair done when there is an interruption 
to the normal functioning of the supercomputer due to failure of a component(s), it involves 
diagnosing the problem and then fixing it to restore the system to its normal operating 
condition. In this case, the repair time can vary a lot depending on the inventory required 
to tackle the problem at hand. Preventive maintenance is a pre scheduled maintenance 
activity with a fixed protocol and most often than not, the inventory required is procured 
before starting the maintenance. In this case, there is a high possibility that the variation of 
maintenance time is low. Therefore, it is proposed to model the repair times of emergency 
and preventive maintenance separately. JMP Pro software is used to model the probability 
life distributions of the repair times for each supercomputer.  Figure 12 shows the 




Figure 12: Schematic representation of the supercomputer maintenance process 
 
 
4.2 Model Selection Measures  
This section elaborates the measures used for selecting the best probability distribution that 
fits the repair times, among the six common distributions considered, exponential, logistic, 
log-logistic, lognormal, normal, and, Weibull distributions. Traditionally, log-likelihood 
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values are calculated for all the distributions considered and the one with highest log-
likelihood value is chosen to be the best distribution that fits the data. But, this method has 
a limitation in that the log-likelihood can be increased by adding parameters to a model 
i.e., a model with higher number of parameters always has a higher log-likelihood value. 
Higher number of parameters in a model may lead to over fitting which is not always good. 
There should be a proper balance between fitting the best model, while avoiding the over 
fitting.  
  
In order to address the limitation of the log-likelihood measure in selecting the best model 
among the considered models we used AICc (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwarz, 1978) 
measures introduced by Akaike Hirotugu and Gideon Schwarz, respectively. Both these 
measures are based on the log-likelihood value and take the form, 2[−𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 +
𝑝𝑐] where 𝑝 is the number of parameters in the model and 𝑐 is [𝑛/(𝑛 − 𝑝 − 1)] for AICc 
and ln 𝑛 for BIC, 𝑛 being the total number of maintenance activities. AICc is a measure of 
relative distance between the unknown true likelihood function of the data and the fitted 
likelihood function of the model and a model with lower AICc is closer to the truth. BIC 
is a measure of the posterior probability of a model being true under a certain Bayesian 
setup and a model with lower BIC is more liker to be the true model.  
 
BIC penalizes a complex model more heavily than AICc and the only way they may 
disagree is when BIC chooses a smaller model (model with lesser number of parameters) 
than AICc. AICc always tends to choose a bigger model (model with higher number of 
parameters), regardless of sample size whereas BIC has very little chance of choosing a 
bigger model if sample size is just sufficient to fit a model otherwise it usually tends to 
select a smaller model. AICc is a better measure in situations where a false negative 
selection would be more misleading than a false positive and BIC is a better measure 
otherwise (Burnham & Anderson, 2004).  
 
Without loss of generality −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 is used instead of 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 whenever 
it is used against AICc and BIC to maintain the same sign and make it comparable to AICc 
and BIC in terms of magnitude. 
 
4.3 Tested Distributions 
Six probability distributions which are widely used to model the reliability data are tested 
for their fitness to the repair time data of each supercomputer. The six probability 
distributions are: exponential, logistic, log-logistic, lognormal, normal, and, Weibull 
distributions. It is observed from our results in this chapter that lognormal and Weibull 
distributions always fit the repair time data better than other four distributions. Therefore, 
the rest of this section introduces the lognormal and Weibull distributions.   
 
Let 𝑇 be a continuous random variable representing the time to maintenance, be it 
emergency or preventive maintenance with a probability density function of ℎ(𝑡), then the 
cumulative distribution function, 𝐻(𝑡) is the probability that the maintenance time is less 
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than time 𝑡 . Let 𝑀𝑀𝑇 and 𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑑  denote the mean and median of the maintenance times of 
the supercomputer. 
 
4.3.1 Weibull distribution 
The cumulative density function, 𝐻(𝑡) for Weibull distribution with scale parameter, 𝜆 and 
shape parameter, 𝛽 is  
    ttH  exp)(  (11) 
The mean, median, standard deviation of time to maintenance of supercomputer, defined 
by the Weibull distribution are  
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4.3.2 Lognormal distribution 
The cumulative density function of failure, 𝐻(𝑡) for lognormal distribution with location 





























where )(znor  represent the cumulative density function of a normal distribution. The 
mean, median, standard deviation of time to maintenance of supercomputer, defined by the 
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22 2)1(   eeSdev  (19) 
 
Once the mean and standard deviation are calculated, the 95% confidence interval 𝐶𝐼0.95  















95.0  (20) 
where 𝑍𝛼
2
 is the value corresponding to 
𝛼
2
 in the standard normal distribution table and 𝑛 is 
the total number of maintenance activities. 
 
4.4 Emergency Maintenance  
This section shows the analysis done on the maintenance time distributions of the 
emergency maintenance activities. For each of the four supercomputers, the emergency 
maintenance records are fitted by the six probability distributions (in Section 4.3) and are 
compared by three measures, (−2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑), AICc and BIC (in Section 4.2). Sections 
4.4.1 - 4.4.4 presents the results for the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, 
and Kraken, respectively and Section 4.7 summarizes the results.  
 
4.4.1 Athena 
For Athena, there are 36 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc 
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 4 shows the results for 
Athena. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Athena with 
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution 












tH nor  (21) 
The estimate of mean emergency maintenance time (𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇) for Athena is 3.15 hours, 
standard deviation is 5.66 and the median is 1.53 hours. This shows that the emergency 
maintenance time distribution is heavily skewed towards positive side. The 95% 
confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (1.61, 6.84). On an average, it will 
take 3.15 hours to perform an emergency maintenance on Athena and there is a huge 
variation in the repair times. 
 
 
Table 4: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Athena 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 143.37 147.75 150.48 
Log-logistic 145.67 150.05 152.78 
Exponential 150.59 152.71 154.15 
Weibull 149.02 153.39 156.13 
Logistic 189.05 193.42 196.16 






For Jaguar, there are 58 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and 
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 5 shows the results for 
Jaguar. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Jaguar with 
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values.  
 












tH nor  (22) 
The estimate of 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar is 4.17 hours, standard deviation is 3.69 and the median 
is 3.12 hours. On an average, it takes 4.17 hours to perform an emergency maintenance on 
Jaguar. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (2.90, 5.02). 
 
 
Table 5: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Jaguar 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 231.25 235.48 239.22 
Log-logistic 232.53 236.77 240.51 
Weibull 237.46 241.69 245.43 
Exponential 250.89 252.97 254.88 
Logistic 250.71 254.94 258.69 
Normal 264.03 268.26 272.00 
 
 
4.4.3 Jaguar PF 
For Jaguar PF, there are 133 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc 
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 6 shows the results for 
Jaguar PF. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Jaguar PF 
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal 












tH nor  (23) 
 
The estimate of 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar PF is 3.62 hours, standard deviation is 2.29 and the 
median is 3.06 hours. Thus, it will take 3.62 hours on an average to perform an emergency 
maintenance on Jaguar PF. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time 





Table 6: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Jaguar PF 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 491.15 495.25 500.86 
Log-logistic 492.89 496.99 502.60 
Weibull 522.02 526.12 531.73 
Logistic 543.45 547.55 553.15 
Normal 568.53 572.63 578.23 




For Kraken, there are 133 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc 
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for 
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Kraken with 
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution 












tH nor  (24) 
The estimate of 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 is 2.67 hours, standard deviation is 3.29 and the median is 1.68 
hours. One an average, it takes 2.67 hours on an average to perform an emergency 
maintenance on Kraken but there is a huge variation in the repair times. The 95% 
confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (1.76, 4.19). 
 
 
Table 7: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Kraken 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 201.29 205.53 209.24 
Log-logistic 204.36 208.60 212.30 
Exponential 214.98 217.05 218.95 
Weibull 214.97 219.21 222.92 
Logistic 265.25 269.49 273.19 
Normal 271.33 275.57 279.27 
 
 
4.5 Preventive Maintenance  
This section shows the analysis done on the maintenance time distributions of the 
preventive maintenance activities. For the maintenance records of each of the four 
supercomputers, the six probability distributions (in Section 4.3) are tested and compared 
by three measures −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC (in Section 4.2). Sections 4.5.1 - 4.5.4 
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presents the results for the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken, 
respectively and Section 4.7 summarizes the results.  
 
4.5.1 Athena 
For Kraken, there are 12 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and 
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for 
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance times of Kraken with 
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution 












tH nor  (25) 
The estimate of mean preventive maintenance time (𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇) is 2.2 hours, standard 
deviation is 1.07 and the median is 1.97 hours. One an average, it takes 2.2 hours to perform 
a preventive maintenance activity on Athena. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated 
mean repair time is (1.56, 3.21). 
 
 
Table 8: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Athena 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 29.19 34.69 33.99 
Weibull 30.23 35.73 35.03 
Log-logistic 30.32 35.82 35.12 
Normal 31.56 37.06 36.36 
Logistic 32.52 38.02 37.32 




For Kraken, there are 31 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and 
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for 
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance repair times of Kraken 
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal 












tH nor  (26) 
The estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 is 5.45 hours, standard deviation 2.69 and the median is 4.89 hours. 
On an average, it takes 5.45 hours to perform a preventive maintenance activity on Jaguar. 





Table 9: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Jaguar 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 139.06 143.49 145.93 
Log-logistic 139.90 144.33 146.77 
Weibull 143.79 148.22 150.66 
Logistic 145.38 149.81 152.25 
Normal 148.70 153.12 155.56 
Exponential 167.16 169.30 170.60 
 
 
4.5.3 Jaguar PF 
For Jaguar PF, there are 42 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc 
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for 
Jaguar PF. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance repair times of 
Jaguar PF with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. 
 
The fitted Weibull distribution with 𝜆 = 0.0555 and 𝛽 = 1.1800, is given by 
   1800.10555.0exp1)(ˆ ttH   (27) 
 
 
Table 10: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Jaguar PF 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Weibull 260.87 265.18 268.35 
Logistic 265.19 269.50 272.67 
Normal 266.77 271.08 274.25 
Lognormal 267.01 271.32 274.49 
Log-logistic 268.55 272.86 276.02 
Exponential 279.87 281.97 283.61 
 
 
The estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 is 10.3 hours, standard deviation is 2.4 and the median is 9.85 
hours. On an average, it will take 10.3 hours to perform a preventive maintenance activity 




For Kraken, there are 23 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and 
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for 
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance repair times of Kraken 
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with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal 












tH nor  (28) 
 
 
Table 11: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Kraken 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 98.64 103.27 104.82 
Log-logistic 99.25 103.88 105.43 
Weibull 103.07 107.70 109.25 
Logistic 106.63 111.26 112.81 
Normal 108.42 113.05 114.60 
Exponential 115.98 118.18 119.07 
 
 
The estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 is 5.11 hours, standard deviation 2.77 and the median is 4.50 hours. 
On an average, it will take 5.11 hours to perform a preventive maintenance activity on 
Kraken. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (3.88, 6.89). 
 
4.6 Emergency and Preventive Maintenance  
This section shows the analysis done on the repair time distributions of the both emergency 
and preventive maintenance activities considered together. For each data set of a 
supercomputer, the six probability distributions (in Section 4.3) are tested and compared 
by three measures −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC (in Section 4.2). Sections 4.4.1 - 4.4.4 
presents the results for the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken, 
respectively and Section 4.7 summarizes the results.  
 
4.6.1 Athena 
For Athena, there are 48 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC 
values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 4 shows the results for Athena. 
Lognormal distribution best fits the maintenance repair times of Athena with the 
smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution with 












tH nor  (29) 
The estimate of mean maintenance time (𝑀𝑀𝑇) is 3.80 hours, standard deviation is 6.86 
and the median is 1.84 hours. On an average, it will take 3.80 hours to perform maintenance 




Table 12: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Athena 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 207.92 212.19 215.62 
Log-logistic 209.01 213.28 216.71 
Weibull 216.55 220.82 224.25 
Exponential 224.40 226.49 228.25 
Logistic 287.05 291.32 294.75 




For Jaguar, there are 89 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values 
for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 5 shows the results for Jaguar. Weibull 
distribution best fits the maintenance repair times of Jaguar with the 
smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted Weibull distribution with 𝜆 =
0.1471 and 𝜆 = 1.2400 is  
   2400.11471.0exp1)(ˆ ttH   (30) 
 
 
Table 13: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Jaguar 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Weibull 434.39 438.52 443.37 
Exponential 440.93 442.97 445.42 
Log-logistic 441.45 445.59 450.43 
Logistic 455.17 459.31 464.14 
Lognormal 472.68 476.81 481.65 
Normal 493.93 498.07 502.91 
 
 
The estimate of 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is 4.69 hours and the standard deviation is 3.55. On an average, it 
takes 4.69 hours to perform maintenance on Jaguar.  
 
4.6.3 Jaguar PF 
For Jaguar PF, there are 175 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC 
values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 6 shows the results for Jaguar 
PF. Weibull distribution best fits the emergency maintenance repair times of Jaguar PF 
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values.  The fitted Weibull distribution 
with 𝛼 = 0.1204 and 𝛽 = 1.2200 is  
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   2200.11204.0exp1)(ˆ ttH   (31) 
The estimate of 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is 5.31 hours and the standard deviation is 4.38. Thus, it will take 
3.62 hours on an average to perform an emergency maintenance on Jaguar PF.  
 
 
Table 14: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Jaguar PF 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Weibull 869.56 873.63 879.83 
Log-logistic 894.30 898.37 904.57 
Lognormal 897.71 901.78 907.98 
Exponential 905.59 907.61 910.73 
Logisitc 985.37 989.44 995.64 




For Kraken, there are 76 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC 
values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for Kraken. 
Lognormal distribution best fits the maintenance repair times of Kraken with the 
smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution with 












tH nor  (32) 
The estimate of 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is 3.96 hours, standard deviation is 4.06 and the median is 4.50 
hours. One an average, it takes 3.96 hours on an average to perform a maintenance on 
Kraken but there is a huge variation in the repair times.  
 
 
Table 15: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Kraken 
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC 
Lognormal 347.17 351.33 355.83 
Log-logistic 352.37 356.53 361.03 
Exponential 364.28 366.33 368.61 
Weibull 363.83 368.00 372.50 
Logistic 431.11 435.27 439.77 






It is observed that lognormal distribution is the best fit for the emergency maintenance 
times, for the four supercomputers. The preventive maintenance times of each of Athena, 
Jaguar and Kraken are fitted the best by lognormal distribution, whereas that of Jaguar PF 
is fitted by a Weibull distribution. Considering both the emergency and preventive 
maintenance actions together, lognormal distribution is the best fit for the maintenance 
times of Athena, and Kraken and Weibull distribution is the best fit for the maintenance 
times of Jaguar, and Jaguar PF. Table 16 presents the maintenance time distributions and 
the estimated mean maintenance time for the four supercomputers. 
 
 
Table 16: Maintenance (repair) time statistics 
 Emergency only Preventive only 
Emergency & 
Preventive 
Supercomputer Distribution 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 Distribution 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 Distribution 𝑀𝑀𝑇 
Athena lognormal 3.15 lognormal 2.20 lognormal 3.80 
Jaguar lognormal 4.17 lognormal 5.45 Weibull 4.38 
Jaguar PF lognormal 3.62 Weibull 10.30 Weibull 5.31 
Kraken lognormal 2.67 lognormal 5.11 lognormal 3.96 
 
 
The observations that can be inferred from the table and the basic statistics presented in 
Section 4.4 - 4.6 are: 
 The mean emergency maintenance times of each of the four supercomputers are 
comparable to each other, whereas the mean preventive maintenance times are very 
dissimilar. This may be attributed to the difference in size of each supercomputer 
leading to the difference in the time taken to complete a preventive maintenance 
action. 
 The variation in the preventive maintenance times for each supercomputer is lesser 
compared to the variation in the emergency maintenance times. This is as expected, 
the variation in a pre-scheduled activity will be less than the variation in an 
unplanned activity. The inventory requirements for the preventive maintenance 
would be standard and can be arranged for before the activity but in case of 
emergency maintenance, the inventory is comparatively unpredictable and may 
need time for procurement. 
 The variation in emergency maintenance times of Athena is the highest but the least 
variation in preventive maintenance times, compared to Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and 
Kraken. Thus for Athena, giving an estimate of maintenance time once a failure has 
occurred is challenging and is the least predictable but its maintenance time for a 
preventive maintenance is the most predictable of all the four supercomputers. 
 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar PF is almost twice as that of Athena or Jaguar or Kraken. This 
can be attributed to the fact that it is the biggest of the four supercomputers in terms 
of architecture and has the highest speed. Nevertheless, more understanding on the 
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actual activities performed during a preventive maintenance of Jaguar PF will help 
root-cause the reasons and come up with a plan to reduce the preventive 
maintenance time. 
 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of Athena is the least among the four supercomputers and is equal to 2.20 
hours, very less compared to that of the other three supercomputers. This may be 





5 AVAILABILITY AND MAINTENANCE POLICY 
This chapter discusses the achieved and predicted performance measures of the four 
supercomputers.  Section 5.1 presents the availability functions and compares the 
availability of each supercomputer. Section 5.2 discusses the effectiveness of existing 
maintenance policy and proposes new maintenance policy. Section 5.3 summarizes the 
work done and the observations to be noted in this chapter. 
 
5.1 Availability 
Availability is the probability that a system or component is performing its required 
function at a specified point of time or over a specified period of time when operated under 
stated conditions. The terms ‘required function’ and ‘stated conditions’ are predefined and 
agreed upon by the stake holders. It is the fraction of a time period that an item is in a 
condition to perform its intended function upon demand (SEMI, 1986,2004). 
 
5.1.1 Achieved availability 
Achieved availability is the average availability of the supercomputer over the period of 
time during which the maintenance records are available. It takes both emergency 
maintenance and preventive maintenance into account. It is the fraction of time that the 
supercomputer is available, of the total time the supercomputer was observed. The 









  (33) 
where 𝑇𝑛 is the total operating time of the supercomputer and 𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝑇) is the total 
maintenance time of the supercomputer, during the period for which the maintenance 
records are available. Figure 5 shows the schematic representation of the total operating 
time and the total maintenance time. 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is used as the maintenance can be emergency 
or preventive and 𝑞 is the total number of expected interrupts given by, 
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The values of GPIM parameters, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝜆, and 𝛽 are taken from Table 2, and the value of 
𝑀𝑀𝑇 are taken from Table 16, for each of the four supercomputers.  
 
Downtime per year, 𝐷 is a frequently used availability metric. The four supercomputers 
run continuously throughout the year, 365 days that is 8760 hours. Thus the downtime per 
year in days will be (Vargas, 2000), 
 )1(365 aAD   (35) 
 
Table 17 presents the achieved availability and downtime per year for each of the four 
supercomputers. These numbers quantify the availability of each supercomputer during the 
time period for which the maintenance records are available. It can be observed that Jaguar 
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PF has the least availability and is explained by the fact that it has 175 interrupts, much 
higher than the interrupts recorded on each of the other three supercomputers. Also Jaguar 
PF has the highest 𝑀𝑀𝑇 contributed by 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of 10.3 hours which is almost twice 
compared to 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of the other three supercomputers. This means that Jaguar PF has a 
higher percentage of time spend on maintenance compared to that of Athena, Jaguar and 








Athena 0.9701 11 
Jaguar 0.9759 9 
Jaguar PF 0.9150 31 
Kraken 0.9374 23 
 
 
5.1.2 Predicted point availability 
Point availability is the availability of the supercomputer to perform a job at a specified 
time point, 𝑡. The point availability is an equivalent term for a repairable system as is 
reliability to a component. Reliability of a supercomputer is the probability that the 
supercomputer with its hardware and software components is capable of performing its 
intended function under normal operating conditions over the specified period of time 
(Jane, 1996). Thus, the predicted point availability of the supercomputer at a particular 
time, 𝑡 is the probability that it will function satisfactorily without interruption up to and 
until time, 𝑡 after the system is restored from the last recorded interrupt.  
 
Let 𝑓(𝑡) be the probability density function of the interrupt distribution, 𝐹(𝑡) be its 
cumulative density function and 𝑅(𝑡) be the reliability function. The relation between these 
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Let 𝑚(𝑡1, 𝑡2) be the expected number of interrupts in the interval (𝑡1, 𝑡2) and is related to 
the failure intensity function by 






21 ,   (37) 
and is related to reliability function by the below equation. 




The point availability of the supercomputer at time, 𝑡 after the last recorded maintenance 
is  
     tmtA GPIMp ,0exp   (39) 
where, 𝑚𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑀(0, 𝑡) is the number of expected number of interrupts in the interval  (0, 𝑡) 
with the failure intensity function modelled by GPIM. The failure intensity function 
changes after every maintenance action when it is modelled by GPIM. Thus, to understand 
the point availability of the supercomputer after the last recorded interrupt, it is important 
to calculate its failure intensity function at the end of its last recorded maintenance. The 
number of maintenance records shown in Table 1 and reliability and maintainability 
parameters shown in Table 2 are used to compute the failure intensity function of each 
supercomputer at the end of the last maintenance action. It has to be noted that the 
maintenance records are event terminated and thus the system operating time at the point 
of last interrupt is different for each supercomputer. Table 18 presents the failure intensity 
function at the end of the last recorded maintenance for each of the four supercomputers.  
 
 
Table 18: Failure intensity function after the last recorded maintenance 
Supercomputer 𝜌(𝑡)  
Athena 0.1260𝑡0.0415 
Jaguar 0.0051𝑡−0.2500 




Figure 13 shows the variation of point availability of each of the four supercomputers with 
the increase in time (from the point of last recorded maintenance). It can be clearly seen 
that Jaguar is the most reliable system and Kraken, Jaguar PF, and Athena follow in 
decreasing order. The probability that Athena is available to perform a job after 50 hours 
of the last recorded maintenance is almost zero. This is because of its high failure intensity 
contributed by the scaling factor of 1.6231 after each preventive maintenance. There is 
50% probability that Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF and Kraken are available to take up a job 
after 5 hours, 470 hours, 28 hours, and 73 hours respectively, after the last recorded 
maintenance. 
 
5.1.3 Predicted average availability 
This section attempts to predict the average availability of the supercomputer for a required 
operating time period after the last recorded maintenance observed at an operating time 
of  𝑇𝑛. In order to predict the average availability for a period of time beyond the last 
recorded maintenance, it is required to estimate the time points at which emergency 





Figure 13: Point availability vs time  
 
 
emergency (preventive) interrupts occur at regular intervals with time period equal to the 
mean time to emergency (preventive) interrupts, 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐼 (𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑃𝐼) which are estimated 
from the available maintenance records.  
 
Let 𝑛𝑒 be the number of emergency interrupts and 𝑛𝑝 be the number of preventive 
interrupts during the supercomputer operating time interval (𝑇𝑛, 𝑡 + 𝑇𝑛). The predicted 
average availability during this interval, assuming that the supercomputer are maintained 
as per the existing maintenance policy is 
















































n pe ;  (41) 
The GPIM results presented in Section 3.3 indicate that the preventive maintenance has 
positive impact only on Jaguar, thus it is of interest to understand the predicted average 
availability of the supercomputer assuming that the preventive maintenance is discontinued 
after the last recorded maintenance.  In this case, the interruption is only caused due to 
emergency maintenance and the predicted average availability is  
































The values of GPIM parameters, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝜆, and 𝛽 are taken from Table 2, and the values of 
𝑀𝑀𝑇 and 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 are taken from Table 16, for each of the four supercomputers.  Table 19 
presents the 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐼 and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑃𝐼 for each of the four supercomputers. It also presents the 
number of emergency and preventive interrupts along with the predicted average 
availability for an operating period of 2160 hours, for each of the four supercomputers. 
 
 
Table 19: Mean time to interrupts and predicted average availability for 2160 hours 




paA   2160/ˆ emergencypaA  
Athena 263.08 1315.38 8 1 0.7212 0.7573 
Jaguar 183.86 355.46 11 6 0.9783 0.9793 
Jaguar PF 77.57 359.25 27 6 0.2406 0.3173 
Kraken 204.31 470.78 10 4 0.7160 0.7890 
 
 
It can be observed that the predicted average availability of Jaguar PF is the least and Jaguar 
is the highest of all the four supercomputers. The predicted average availability considering 
that the preventive maintenance is stopped after the last recorded maintenance is higher 
than the predicted average availability considering that the existing maintenance policy is 
followed, for all the four supercomputers.  
 
5.2 Maintainability 
Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis of maintenance times of the four supercomputers and 
provides insights into the maintenance in terms of the number of man hours spend on the 
maintenance activity. This section reviews the maintenance policy of each supercomputer 
based on the reliability and maintenance parameters presented in Table 2 and the different 
measures of availability presented in Section 5.1.  
 
Emergency maintenance is performed to restore the supercomputer to normal operating 
condition after an occurrence of a failure and thus it cannot be avoided. Preventive 
maintenance is performed to effectively identify incipient failures and reduce the 
probability of them being actual failures. It is observed that for the existing preventive 
maintenance protocol on the four supercomputers is that it is performed at varying 
intervals, ranging from 15 to 54 days. Preventive maintenance is intended to reduce the 
failure intensity of the supercomputer but contributes to its downtime. Thus an effective 
preventive maintenance policy should be scheduled based on: 
 the improvement it shows on performance of the supercomputer  
 the increase in downtime of the supercomputer 




Section 5.2.1 - 5.2.4 comments on the existing maintenance policy and suggests a new 
preventive maintenance policy to be considered moving further for Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar 
PF and Kraken, respectively. 
 
5.2.1 Athena 
Athena is a stable supercomputer with constant failure intensity. With the existing 
maintenance policy, the failure intensity of Athena is marginally decreased after every 
emergency maintenance action and prominently increased after every preventive 
maintenance action. Thus, it is proposed to 
 Stop performing preventive maintenance actions as they are deteriorating the 
system’s performance. This will increase the system availability; 
 Root-cause the reasons for the preventive maintenance protocol not being effective; 
and 
 Continue to monitor the system and watch out for the system phase transition to 
‘wear out’ where the system starts deteriorating.  
 
5.2.2 Jaguar 
Jaguar is a supercomputer with improving performance. Its failure intensity is not effected 
after each emergency maintenance action but is prominently decreased after each 
preventive maintenance action. The improvement in the predicted average availability of 
the system considering that there is no preventive maintenance is very low as compared to 
the predicted average availability considering the existing maintenance policy with both 
emergency and preventive maintenance. The increase is only 0.1% considering the 
predicted average availability for an operating period of 3 months. Thus, it is proposed that 
the existing maintenance policy be continued on Jaguar.  
 
5.2.3 Jaguar PF 
Jaguar PF is a supercomputer with deteriorating performance. Its failure intensity is not 
effected by each maintenance action, be it emergency or preventive maintenance. The 
improvement in the predicted average availability of the system considering that there is 
no preventive maintenance is prominent as compared to the predicted average availability 
considering the existing maintenance policy with both emergency and preventive 
maintenance. The increase is about 32% considering the predicted average availability for 
an operating period of 3 months. This shows that though the preventive maintenance is not 
altering the failure intensity of Jaguar PF, it is contributing to the system downtime. Thus, 
it is proposes to 
 Stop performing preventive maintenance actions; 
 Root-cause the reasons for the preventive maintenance protocol not being effective 
and come up with an improved protocol. As Jaguar PF is inherently deteriorating, 




 Continue to monitor the system. There may be a point where the rate of 
deterioration is so high that it is required to revamp the system.  
 
5.2.4 Kraken 
Kraken is a stable supercomputer with constant failure intensity. Its failure intensity is not 
effected after each emergency maintenance action and is marginally decreased after every 
preventive maintenance action. The improvement in the predicted average availability of 
the system considering that there is no preventive maintenance is prominent as compared 
to the predicted average availability considering the existing maintenance policy with both 
emergency and preventive maintenance. The increase is about 10% considering the 
predicted average availability for an operating period of 3 months. This shows that the 
decrease in failure intensity of Kraken after each preventive maintenance does not justify 
its increase in system downtime. Thus, it is proposes to 
 Stop performing preventive maintenance actions as the existing protocol does not 
help in improving the system performance; 
 Continue to monitor the system and watch out for the system phase transition to 
‘wear out’ where the system starts deteriorating.  
 
5.3 Summary 
The achieved availability, predicted point availability and predict average availability for 
an operating period of 3 month after the last recorded maintenance are estimated and 
presented for each of the four supercomputers. The maintenance policy of each 
supercomputer is reviewed and it is proposed that the preventive maintenance should not 
be performed on Athena, Jaguar PF and Kraken as it does not improve their performance. 





First, Section 6.1 summarizes the work done in this thesis along with a brief overview of 
the analysis approach. Section 6.2 presents the proposed maintenance policy for each of 
the four supercomputers. Finally, Section 6.3 discusses the scope for future study. 
 
6.1 Summary of Thesis 
The demand to analyze the maintenance records of four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, 
Jaguar PF and Kraken, collected over the period from October 2009 to December 2010 
forms the motivation to this thesis. These supercomputers are located and operated at The 
National Institute for Computational Sciences in Oak Ridge National Lab, Tennessee, US.  
 
Each supercomputer is a considered as a complex repairable system with the occurrence of 
events causing interruption to normal system operation being modelled by stochastic point 
process. In order to understand the system performance characteristics such as reliability, 
availability, and maintainability it is important to fit a mathematical/statistical model to the 
available maintenance record data.  Different maintenance models to analyze the repairable 
systems available in literature are broadly classified into maximal maintenance model, 
minimal maintenance model, and partial maintenance model. These models are reviewed 
and compared. Partial maintenance model that provides the scope to include the 
effectiveness of maintenance actions has been considered to be more appropriate to analyze 
the four supercomputers. 
 
Different approaches to model the partial maintenance models proposed in literature have 
been reviewed. Among these, GPIM and GARM are the appropriate models to 
maintenance data that contain both emergency maintenance and preventive maintenance, 
as is the case with the four supercomputers and allows inclusion of both reliability and 
maintainability parameters in a single model. Finally, GPIM is chosen to be the main model 
for this thesis as it provides more practical physical model and higher potential for 
maintenance decision making than GARM and has the possibility to accommodate future 
extensions to this study, such as including predictor variables and covariates. 
 
The reliability and maintenance parameters of GPIM that fits the maintenance records are 
obtained based on MLE method, using MATLAB, for each supercomputer. Based on the 
reliability parameter estimates it has been observed that Athena and Kraken are stable, 
while Jaguar is improving and Jaguar PF is deteriorating. The maintenance parameter 
estimates show that each emergency maintenance marginally decreases the failure intensity 
of Athena and marginally increases the failure intensity of Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken. 
Each preventive maintenance marginally decreases the failure intensity of Jaguar PF, and 
Kraken, prominently increases the failure intensity of Athena and prominently decreased 
the failure intensity of Jaguar. 
 
While the occurrence of events interrupting supercomputer’s normal operation are 
modelled using GPIM, the maintenance times are modelled by life distributions. The best 
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life distributions fitting the maintenance times, considering only the emergency repairs, 
only the preventive maintenance, and both emergency and preventive maintenance times 
are selected using AICc and BIC model selection measures. The parameters of the chosen 
distributions are estimated using MLE methods. It has been observed that the variation in 
emergency maintenance times are higher that on the preventive maintenance, for all the 
four supercomputers. The 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar PF is distinctly higher than the 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of the 
other three supercomputers. The 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 values of the four supercomputers are distinctly 
different and can be attributed to the difference in size of the supercomputers. 
 
Achieved availability and predicted availability for each supercomputer are estimated 
using maintenance time distributions along with GPIM results. Jaguar PF has the least 
achieved availability and the least predicted average availability. Athena has the least point 
availability. Jaguar has the highest achieved availability, point availability and predicted 
average availability showing that it is the most reliable system of all the four 
supercomputers. 
 
6.2 Proposed Maintenance Policy 
The supercomputers operate continuously and are only interrupted by emergency 
maintenance or preventive maintenance. The maintenance team plan is to perform 
preventive maintenance on each of the four supercomputers, once every two weeks. But, it 
is observed from the maintenance records that the preventive maintenance has not been 
done at regular intervals on any of the four supercomputers. It may be due to some practical 
difficulties and may depend on the existing work load on the supercomputers, etc.  So the 
existing maintenance policy is the one modelled by GPIM based on the maintenance 
records. Based on the study of the existing maintenance records and observation of the 
system performance and maintenance effectiveness, a new maintenance policy that 
improves the availability of the supercomputers and reduces the maintenance costs is 
proposed. 
 
The proposed maintenance policy for each supercomputer is given below. 
 Continue the existing emergency maintenance protocol and stop performing preventive 
maintenance for Athena, Jaguar PF, and Kraken, 
 Continue the existing emergency maintenance and preventive maintenance protocols 
for Jaguar. 
 Jaguar PF is a deteriorating system and the predicted average availability for an 
operating period of 3 months considered after the last recorded maintenance is less than 
32%, which is very low for a supercomputer. Thus, Jaguar PF may need a revamp.   
 Continue to monitor Athena and Kraken to detect any phase transition from stationary 




6.3 Future Scope  
The analysis of maintenance records studied in this thesis provides good insights into the 
system performance and failure characteristics of the four supercomputers. Future 
extension of this thesis can be in the direction: 
 It has to be noted that the proposed maintenance policy is based on the maintenance 
records available during the period from October 2009 to December 2010. The system 
performance characteristics might have changed since then and it is important to use 
the GPIM to fit the latest maintenance records and form the base for a new maintenance 
policy proposal. 
 A computerized maintenance management system can be used to dynamically model 
the interrupts and monitor the supercomputer based on the GPIM and the corresponding 
availability analysis. 
 Linking the statistical model governing the maintenance records to the inventory is one 
other practical use. It is required to understand the failures and their causes at a cluster 
or module level to explore solutions of improving supercomputer availability and 
suggest better ways to handle the spare parts. 
 It is observed there is a drastic difference in the way a preventive maintenance action 
affects each supercomputer. Also, there is lot of variation observed in the preventive 
maintenance times of each supercomputer. This can be due to the fact that the 
preventive maintenance protocol is different for each supercomputer or the same 
preventive maintenance protocol for all the supercomputers is not an effective strategy. 
Root-cause analysis performed on this should provide direction for a more effective 
preventive maintenance. 
 Supercomputers take up huge space and have stringent cooling requirements; in this 
context further work can be done to understand the spatial locations of the failures to 
figure out any location correlations. Workload and failure correlations, failure 
clustering, time span of works run and failure correlations, failure statistics with respect 
to categories like human error, environmental effects, etc. are some important areas to 
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